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Abstract—Good programming languages provide helpful ab-
stractions for writing secure code, but the security properties of
the source language are generally not preserved when compiling a
program and linking it with adversarial code in a low-level target
language (e.g., a library or a legacy application). Linked target
code that is compromised or malicious may, for instance, read and
write the compiled program’s data and code, jump to arbitrary
memory locations, or smash the stack, blatantly violating any
source-level abstraction. By contrast, a fully abstract compilation
chain protects source-level abstractions all the way down, ensur-
ing that linked adversarial target code cannot observe more about
the compiled program than what some linked source code could
about the source program. However, while research in this area
has so far focused on preserving observational equivalence, as
needed for achieving full abstraction, there is a much larger space
of security properties one can choose to preserve against linked
adversarial code. And the precise class of security properties one
chooses crucially impacts not only the supported security goals
and the strength of the attacker model, but also the kind of
protections a secure compilation chain has to introduce.
We are the first to thoroughly explore a large space of formal
secure compilation criteria based on robust property preserva-
tion, i.e., the preservation of properties satisfied against arbitrary
adversarial contexts. We study robustly preserving various classes
of trace properties such as safety, of hyperproperties such as
noninterference, and of relational hyperproperties such as trace
equivalence. This leads to many new secure compilation criteria,
some of which are easier to practically achieve and prove than
full abstraction, and some of which provide strictly stronger
security guarantees. For each of the studied criteria we pro-
pose an equivalent “property-free” characterization that clarifies
which proof techniques apply. For relational properties and
hyperproperties, which relate the behaviors of multiple programs,
our formal definitions of the property classes themselves are
novel. We order our criteria by their relative strength and show
several collapses and separation results. Finally, we adapt existing
proof techniques to show that even the strongest of our secure
compilation criteria, the robust preservation of all relational
hyperproperties, is achievable for a simple translation from a
statically typed to a dynamically typed language.
1 Introduction
Good programming languages provide helpful abstractions for
writing secure code. Even in unsafe low-level languages like
C, safe programs have structured control flow and obey the
procedure call and return discipline. Languages such as Java,
C#, ML, Haskell, or Rust provide type and memory safety
for all programs and additional abstractions such as modules
and interfaces. Languages for efficient cryptography such as
qhasm [16], Jasmin [9], and Low? [61] enforce a “constant-
time” coding discipline to rule out certain side-channel attacks.
Finally, verification languages such as Coq and F? [61, 70]
provide abstractions such as dependent types, logical pre- and
postconditions, and tracking side-effects, e.g., distinguishing
pure from stateful computations. Such abstractions make rea-
soning about security more tractable and have, for instance,
enabled developing high-assurance libraries in areas such as
cryptography [9, 26, 34, 77].
However, such abstractions are not enforced all the way
down by mainstream compilation chains. The security prop-
erties a program satisfies in the source language are generally
not preserved when compiling the program and linking it
with adversarial target code. High-assurance cryptographic
libraries, for instance, get linked into real applications such as
web browsers [19, 34] and web servers, which include millions
of lines of legacy C/C++ code. Even if the abstractions of
the source language ensure that the API of a TLS library
cannot leak the server’s private key [26], such guarantees
are completely lost when compiling the library and linking
it into a C/C++ application that can get compromised via
a buffer overflow, simply allowing the adversary to read the
private key from memory [31]. A compromised or malicious
application that links in a high-assurance library can easily
read and write its data and code, jump to arbitrary memory
locations, or smash the stack, blatantly violating any source-
level abstraction and breaking any security guarantee obtained
by source-level reasoning.
An idea that has been gaining increasing traction recently
is that it should be possible to build secure compilation chains
that protect source-level abstractions even against linked ad-
versarial target code, which is generally represented by target
language contexts. Research in this area has so far focused on
achieving full abstraction [2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 28, 37, 42, 44, 56,
59, 60], whose security-relevant direction ensures that even
an adversarial target context cannot observe more about the
compiled program than some source context could about the
source program. In order to achieve full abstraction, the vari-
ous parts of the secure compilation chain—including, e.g., the
compiler, linker, loader, runtime, system, and hardware—have
to work together to provide enough protection to the compiled
program, so that whenever two programs are observationally
equivalent in the source language (i.e., no source context can
distinguish them), the two programs obtained by compiling
them are observationally equivalent in the target language (i.e.,
no target context can distinguish them).
Observational equivalences are, however, not the only class
of security properties one may want to robustly preserve,
i.e., preserve against arbitrary adversarial contexts. One could
instead be interested in robustly preserving, for instance,
classes of trace properties such as safety [50] or liveness [10],
or of hyperproperties [24] such as hypersafety, including
variants of noninterference [11, 38, 53, 64, 76], which cover
data confidentiality and integrity. However, full abstraction is
generally not strong enough on its own to imply the robust
preservation of any of these properties (as we show in §5, and
as was also argued by others [57]). At the same time, the kind
of protections one has to put in place for achieving full abstrac-
tion seem like overkill if all one wants is to robustly preserve
safety or hypersafety. Indeed, it is significantly harder to hide
the differences between two programs that are observationally
equivalent but otherwise arbitrary, than to protect the internal
invariants and the secret data of a single program. Thus, a
secure compilation chain for robust safety or hypersafety can
likely be more efficient than one for observational equivalence.
Moreover, hiding the differences between two observationally
equivalent programs is hopeless in the presence of any side-
channels, while robustly preserving safety is not a problem
and even robustly preserving noninterference seems possible
in specific scenarios [14]. Finally, even when efficiency is not a
concern (e.g., when security is enforced by static restrictions
on target contexts [1, 6, 7, 56]), proving full abstraction is
notoriously challenging even for simple languages, and con-
jectures have survived for decades before being settled [29].
Convinced that there is no “one-size-fits-all” criterion for
secure interoperability with linked target code, we explore,
for the first time, a large space of secure compilation criteria
based on robust property preservation. Some of the criteria
we introduce are strictly stronger than full abstraction and,
moreover, immediately imply the robust preservation of well-
studied property classes such as safety and hypersafety. Other
criteria we introduce seem easier to practically achieve and
prove than full abstraction. In general, the richer the class of
security properties one tries to robustly preserve, the harder
efficient enforcement becomes, so the best one can hope for
is to strike a pragmatic balance between security and efficiency
that matches each application domain.
For informing such difficult design decisions, we explore
robustly preserving classes of trace properties (§2), of hy-
perproperties (§3), and of relational hyperproperties (§4). All
these property notions are phrased in terms of execution traces,
which for us are (finite or infinite) sequences of events such as
inputs from and outputs to an external environment [48, 51].
Trace properties such as safety [50] restrict what happens
along individual program traces, while hyperproperties [24]
such as noninterference generalize this to predicates over
multiple traces of a program. In this work we generalize
this further to a new class we call relational hyperproperties,
which relate the traces of different programs. An example of
relational hyperproperty is trace equivalence, which requires
that two programs produce the same set of traces. We work
out many interesting subclasses that are also novel, such as
relational trace properties, which relate individual traces of
multiple programs. For instance, “On every input, program A’s
output is less than program B’s” is a relational trace property.
We order the secure compilation criteria we introduce
by their relative strength as illustrated by the partial order
in Figure 1. In this Hasse diagram edges represent logical
implication from higher criteria to lower ones, so the higher a
criterion is, the harder it is to achieve and prove. Intuitively,
the criteria based on the robust preservation of trace properties
(in the yellow area) only require sandboxing the context (i.e.,
linked adversarial code) and protecting the internal invariants
of the program from it, i.e., only data integrity. The criteria
based on hyperproperties (in the red area) require additionally
hiding the data of the program from the context, i.e., data
confidentiality. Finally, the criteria based on relational hyper-
properties (in the blue area) require additionally hiding the
code of the program from the context, i.e., code confidentiality.
While most implications in the diagram follow directly from
the inclusion between the property classes [24], strict inclusion
between property classes does not imply strict implication
between criteria. Robustly preserving two distinct property
classes can in fact lead to equivalent criteria, as happens in
general for hyperliveness and hyperproperties (§3.5) and, in
the presence of source-level reflection or internal nondetermin-
ism, for many criteria involving hyperproperties and relational
hyperproperties (§4.5). To show the absence of more collapses,
we also prove various separation results, for instance that
Robust Safety Property Preservation (RSP) is strictly weaker
than Robust Trace Property Preservation (RTP). For this, we
design (counterexample) compilation chains that satisfy the
weaker criterion but not the stronger one.
For each introduced secure compilation criterion we also
discovered an equivalent “property-free” characterization that
is generally better tailored for proofs and that provides im-
portant insights into what kind of techniques one can use
to prove the criterion. For instance, for proving RSP and
RTP we can produce a different source context to explain
each attack trace, while for proving stronger criteria such as
Robust Hyperproperty Preservation (RHP) we have to produce
a single source context that works for any attack trace.
We also formally study the relation between our new
security criteria and full abstraction (§5) proxied by the
robust preservation of trace equivalence (RTEP), which
in determinate languages—i.e., languages without internal
nondeterminism—was shown to coincide with observational
equivalence [21, 33]. In one direction, RTEP follows uncondi-
tionally from Robust 2-relational Hyperproperty Preservation,
which is one of our stronger criteria. However, if the source
and target languages are determinate and we make some mild
extra assumptions (such as input totality [36, 75]) RTEP
follows even from the weaker Robust 2-relational relaXed
safety Preservation (R2rXP). Here, the challenge was iden-
tifying these extra assumptions and showing that they are
sufficient to establish RTEP. In the other direction, we adapt a
counterexample proposed by Patrignani and Garg [57] to show
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Fig. 1: Partial order with the secure compilation criteria studied in this paper. Criteria higher in the diagram imply the lower
ones to which they are connected by edges. Criteria based on trace properties are grouped in a yellow area, those based on
hyperproperties are in a red area, and those based on relational hyperproperties are in a blue area. Criteria with an italics name
preserve a single property that belongs to the class they are connected to; the dotted edge requires an additional determinacy
assumption. Finally, each edge with a thick arrow denotes a strict implication that we have proved as a separation result.
that RTEP (and thus full abstraction), even in conjunction with
compositional compiler correctness, does not imply even the
weakest of our criteria, RSP, RDP, and RTINIP.
Finally, we show that two proof techniques originally de-
veloped for full abstraction can be readily adapted to prove
our new secure compilation criteria (§6). First, we use a
“universal embedding” [56] to prove that the strongest of our
secure compilation criteria, Robust Relational Hyperproperty
Preservation (RrHP), is achievable for a simple translation
from a statically typed to a dynamically typed first-order
language with first-order functions and I/O. Second, we use
the same simple translation to illustrate that for proving Robust
Finite-relational relaXed safety Preservation (RFrXP) we can
employ a “trace-based back-translation” [43, 59], a slightly
less powerful but more generic technique that we extend to
back-translate a finite set of finite execution prefixes into a
source context. This second technique is applicable to all
criteria implied by RFrXP, which includes robust preservation
of safety, of hypersafety, and in a determinate setting also of
trace (and thus observational) equivalence.
In summary, our paper makes five contributions:
C1. We phrase the formal security guarantees obtained by
protecting compiled programs from adversarial contexts in
terms of robustly preserving classes of properties. We are
the first to explore a large space of security criteria based
on this idea, including criteria that provide strictly stronger
security guarantees than full abstraction, and also criteria that
are easier to practically achieve and prove, which is important
for building more realistic secure compilation chains.
C2. We carefully study each new secure compilation criterion
and the non-trivial relations between them. For each criterion
we propose a property-free characterization that clarifies which
proof techniques apply. For relating the criteria, we order them
by their relative strength, show several interesting collapses,
and prove several challenging separation results.
C3. We introduce relational properties and hyperproperties,
which are new property classes of independent interest, even
outside of secure compilation.
C4. We formally study the relation between our security
criteria and full abstraction. In one direction, we show that
determinacy is enough for robustly preserving classes of rela-
tional properties and hyperproperties to imply preservation of
observational equivalence. In the other direction, we show that,
even when assuming compiler correctness, full abstraction
does not imply even our weakest criteria.
C5. We show that two existing proof techniques originally
developed for full abstraction can be readily adapted to our
new criteria, which is important since good proof techniques
are difficult to find in this space [56, 60].
The paper closes with discussions of related (§7) and future
work (§8). The online appendix at https://arxiv.org/abs/
1807.04603 contains omitted technical details. Many of the
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theorems formally or informally mentioned in the paper were
also mechanized in the Coq proof assistant and are marked
with ; this development has around 4400 lines of code and
is available at https://github.com/secure-compilation/
exploring-robust-property-preservation
2 Robustly Preserving Trace Properties
In this section we look at robustly preserving classes of trace
properties, and first study the robust preservation of all trace
properties and its relation to correct compilation (§2.1). We
then look at robustly preserving safety properties (§2.2), which
are the trace properties that can be falsified by a finite trace
prefix (e.g., a program never performs a certain dangerous
system call). These criteria are grouped in the Trace Properties
yellow area in Figure 1. We also carefully studied the robust
preservation of liveness properties, but it turns out that the
very definition of liveness is highly dependent on the specifics
of the program execution traces, which makes that part more
technical. For saving space and avoiding a technical detour, we
relegate to the appendix the details of our CompCert-inspired
trace model, as well as the part about liveness.
2.1 Robust Trace Property Preservation (RTP)
Like all secure compilation criteria we study in this paper,
the RTP criterion below is a generic property of an arbitrary
compilation chain, which includes a source and a target lan-
guage, each with a notion of partial programs (P ) and contexts
(C) that can be linked together to produce whole programs
(C[P ]), and each with a trace-producing semantics for whole
programs (C[P ]  t). The sets of partial programs and of
contexts of the source and target languages are unconstrained
parameters of our secure compilation criteria; our criteria make
no assumptions about their structure, or whether the program
or the context gets control initially once linked and executed
(e.g., the context could be an application that embeds a library
program or the context could be a library that is embedded
into an application program).1 The traces produced by the
source and target semantics2 are arbitrary for RTP, but for
RSP we have to consider traces with a specific structure
(finite or infinite sequences of events drawn from an arbitrary
set). Intuitively, traces capture the interaction between a whole
program and its external environment, including for instance
user input, output to a terminal, network communication,
system calls, etc. [48, 51]. As opposed to a context, which
is just a piece of a program, the environment’s behavior is not
(and often cannot be) modeled by the programming language,
beyond the (often nondeterministic) interaction events that we
store in the trace. Finally, a compilation chain includes a
1 One limitation of our formal setup, is that for simplicity we assume
that any partial program can be linked with any context, irrespective of their
interfaces (e.g., types or specs). One can extend our criteria to take interfaces
into account, as we illustrate in the appendix for the example in §6.
2In this paper we assume for simplicity that traces are exactly the same
in both the source and target language, as is also the case in the CompCert
verified C compiler [51]. We hope to lift this restriction in the future (§8).
compiler: the compilation of a partial source program P is
a partial target program we write P↓.3
The responsibility of enforcing secure compilation does not
have to rest just with the compiler, but may be freely shared
by various parts of the compilation chain. In particular, to
help enforce security, the target-level linker could disallow
linking with a suspicious context (e.g., one that is not well-
typed [1, 6, 7, 56]) or could always allow linking but introduce
protection barriers between the program and the context (e.g.,
by instrumenting the program [28, 56] or the context [4, 72,
73] to introduce dynamic checks). Similarly, the semantics of
the target language can include various protection mechanisms
(e.g., processes with different virtual address spaces [62], pro-
tected enclaves [59], capabilities [23, 68, 74], etc.). Finally, the
compiler might have to refrain from aggressive optimizations
that would break security [14, 30, 67]. Our secure compilation
criteria are agnostic to the concrete enforcement mechanism
used by the compilation chain to protect the compiled program
from the adversarial target context.
Trace properties are defined simply as sets of allowed
traces [50]. A whole program C[P ] satisfies a trace property pi
when the set of traces produced by C[P ] is included in the set
pi or, formally, {t | C[P ]  t} ⊆ pi. More interestingly, we
say that a partial program P robustly satisfies [39, 49, 71]
a trace property pi when P linked with any (adversarial)
context C satisfies pi. Armed with this, Robust Trace Property
Preservation (RTP) is defined as the preservation of robust
satisfaction of all trace properties. So if a partial source
program P robustly satisfies a trace property pi ∈ 2Trace (wrt.
all source contexts) then its compilation P↓ must also robustly
satisfy pi (wrt. all target contexts). If we unfold all intermediate
definitions, a compilation chain satisfies RTP iff:
RTP : ∀pi ∈ 2Trace. ∀P. (∀CS t.CS [P] t⇒ t ∈ pi)⇒
(∀CT t.CT [P↓] t⇒ t ∈ pi)
This definition directly captures which properties (specifi-
cally, all trace properties) of the source are robustly preserved
by the compilation chain. However, in order to prove that a
compilation chain satisfies RTP we propose an equivalent ( )
“property-free” characterization, which we call RTC (for
“RTP Characterization”):
RTC : ∀P. ∀CT. ∀t. CT [P↓] t⇒∃CS.CS [P] t
RTC requires that, given a compiled program P↓ and a target
context CT which together produce an attack trace t, we can
generate a source context CS that causes trace t to be produced
by P. When proving that a compilation chain satisfies RTC we
can pick a different context CS for each t and, in fact, try to
construct CS from trace t or from the execution CT [P↓] t.
We present similar property-free characterizations for each
of our criteria (Figure 1). However, for criteria stronger than
RTP, a single context CS will have to work for more than
one trace. In general, the shape of the property-free character-
3For easier reading, we use a blue, sans-serif font for source elements, an
orange,bold font for target elements and a black, italic font generically
for elements of either language.
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ization explains what information can be used to produce the
source context CS when proving a compilation chain secure.
Relation to compiler correctness RTC is similar to “back-
ward simulation” (TC), a standard compiler correctness crite-
rion [51]. Let W denote a whole program.
TC : ∀W. ∀t. W↓ t⇒W t
Maybe slightly less known is that this property-free character-
ization of correct compilation also has an equivalent property-
full characterization as the preservation of all trace properties:
TP : ∀pi ∈ 2Trace. ∀W.
(∀t.W t⇒ t ∈ pi)⇒ (∀t. W↓ t⇒ t ∈ pi)
The major difference compared to RTP is that TP only
preserves the trace properties of whole programs and does
not consider adversaries. In contrast, RTP allows linking a
compiled partial program with arbitrary target contexts and
protects the program so that all robustly satisfied trace proper-
ties are preserved. In general, RTP and TP are incomparable.
However, RTP strictly implies TP when whole programs (W )
are a subset of partial programs (P ) and, additionally, the
semantics of whole programs is independent of any linked
context (i.e., ∀W t C. W  t ⇐⇒ C[W ]  t, which
happens, intuitively, when the whole program starts execution
and, being whole, never calls into the context).
More compositional criteria for compiler correctness have
also been proposed [45, 55]. At a minimum such criteria
allow linking with contexts that are the compilation of source
contexts [45], which can be formalized as follows:
SCC : ∀P. ∀CS. ∀t. CS↓ [P↓] t⇒ CS [P] t
More permissive criteria allow linking with any target context
that behaves like some source context [55], which in our
setting can be written as:
CCC : ∀P CT CS t. CT≈CS ∧CT [P↓] t⇒ CS [P] t
Here ≈ relates equivalent partial programs in the target and the
source, and could, for instance, be instantiated with a cross-
language logical relation [6, 55]. RTP is incomparable to SCC
and CCC. On the one hand, RTP allows linking with arbitrary
target-level contexts, which is not allowed by SCC and CCC,
and requires inserting strong protection barriers. On the other
hand, in RTP all source-level reasoning has to be done with
respect to an arbitrary source context, while with SCC and
CCC one can reason about a known source context.
2.2 Robust Safety Property Preservation (RSP)
Robust safety preservation is an interesting criterion for secure
compilation because it is easier to achieve and prove than most
criteria of Figure 1, while still being quite expressive [39, 71].
Recall that a trace property is a safety property if, within
any (possibly infinite) trace that violates the property, there
exists a finite “bad prefix” that violates it. We write m ≤ t
for the prefix relation between a finite trace prefix m and a
trace t. Using this we define safety properties in the usual
way [10, 50, 66]:
Safety , {pi ∈ 2Trace | ∀t 6∈ pi. ∃m ≤ t. ∀t′ ≥ m. t′ 6∈ pi}
The definition of RSP simply restricts the preservation of
robust satisfaction from all trace properties in RTP to only
safety properties; otherwise the definition is exactly the same:
RSP : ∀pi ∈ Safety. ∀P. (∀CS t.CS [P] t⇒ t ∈ pi)⇒
(∀CT t.CT [P↓] t⇒ t ∈ pi)
One might wonder how safety properties can be robustly
satisfied in the source, given that execution traces can contain
events emitted not just by the partial program but also by the
adversarial context, which could trivially emit “bad events”
and, hence, violate any safety property. A first alternative is
for the semantics of the source language to simply prevent
the context from producing any events, maybe other than
termination, or, at least, prevent the context from producing
any events the safety properties of interest consider bad. The
compilation chain has then to “sandbox” the context to restrict
the events it can produce [72, 73]. A second alternative is
for the source semantics to record enough information in the
trace so that one can determine the origin of each event—the
partial program or the context. Then, safety properties in which
the context’s events are never bad can be robustly satisfied.
With this second alternative, the obtained global guarantees
are weaker, e.g., one cannot enforce that the whole program
never makes a dangerous system call, but only that the partial
program cannot be tricked by the context into making it.
The equivalent ( ) property-free characterization for RSP
requires one to back-translate a program (P), a target context
(CT), and a finite bad trace prefix (CT [P↓]  m) into a
source context (CS) producing the same finite trace prefix (m)
in the source (CS [P] m):
RSC : ∀P. ∀CT. ∀m. CT [P↓] m⇒ ∃CS.CS [P] m
Syntactically, the only change with respect to RTC is the
switch from whole traces t to finite trace prefixes m. As for
RTC, we can pick a different context CS for each execution
CT [P↓]  m. (In our formalization we define W  m
generically as ∃t≥m. W  t.) The fact that for RSC these
are finite execution prefixes can significantly simplify the back-
translation into source contexts (as we show in §6.4).
It is trivially true that RTP implies RSP, since the former
robustly preserves all trace properties while the latter only
robustly preserves safety properties. We have also proved that
RTP strictly implies RSP.
Theorem 2.1. RTP⇒ RSP, but RSP 6⇒ RTP
Proof sketch. As explained above, RTP ⇒ RSP is trivial.
Showing strictness requires constructing a counterexample
compilation chain to the reverse implication. We take any
target language that can produce infinite traces. We take the
source language to be a variant of the target with the same
partial programs, but where we extend whole programs and
contexts with a bound on the number of events they can
produce before being terminated. Compilation simply erases
this bound. This compilation chain satisfies RSP (equivalently,
RSC) but not RTP. To show that it satisfies RSC, we simply
back-translate a target context CT and a finite trace prefix m to
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a source context (CT, length(m)) that uses the length of m as
the allowed bound, so this context can still produce m in the
source without being prematurely terminated. However, this
compilation chain does not satisfy RTP, since in the source
all executions are finite and, hence, no infinite target trace can
be simulated by any source context.
3 Robustly Preserving Hyperproperties
So far, we have studied the robust preservation of trace prop-
erties, which are properties of individual traces of a program.
In this section we generalize this to hyperproperties, which are
properties of multiple traces of a program [24]. A well-known
hyperproperty is noninterference [11, 38, 53, 76], which usu-
ally requires considering two traces of a program that differ
on secret inputs. Another hyperproperty is bounded mean re-
sponse time over all executions. We study robust preservation
of many subclasses of hyperproperties: all hyperproperties
(§3.1), subset-closed hyperproperties (§3.2), hypersafety and
K-hypersafety (§3.3), and hyperliveness (§3.5). These criteria
are in the red area in Figure 1.
3.1 Robust Hyperproperty Preservation (RHP)
While trace properties are sets of traces, hyperproperties are
sets of sets of traces [24]. We call the set of traces of a whole
program W the behavior of W : Behav (W ) = {t | W  t}.
A hyperproperty is a set of allowed behaviors. Program W
satisfies hyperproperty H if the behavior of W is a member
of H , i.e., Behav (W ) ∈ H , or, equivalently, {t | W  t} ∈
H . Contrast this to W satisfying trace property pi, which
holds if the behavior of W is a subset of the set pi, i.e.,
Behav (W ) ⊆ pi, or, equivalently, ∀t. W  t ⇒ t ∈ pi.
So while a trace property determines whether each individual
trace of a program should be allowed or not, a hyperproperty
determines whether the set of traces of a program, its behavior,
should be allowed or not. For instance, the trace property
pi123 = {t1, t2, t3} is satisfied by programs with behaviors
such as {t1}, {t2}, {t2, t3}, and {t1, t2, t3}, but a program
with behavior {t1, t4} does not satisfy pi123. A hyperproperty
like H1+23 = {{t1}, {t2, t3}} is satisfied only by programs
with behavior {t1} or with behavior {t2, t3}. A program with
behavior {t2} does not satisfy H1+23, so hyperproperties can
express that if some traces (e.g., t2) are possible then some
other traces (e.g., t3) should also be possible. A program
with behavior {t1, t2, t3} also does not satisfy H1+23, so
hyperproperties can express that if some traces (e.g., t2 and
t3) are possible then some other traces (e.g., t1) should not
be possible. Finally, trace properties can be easily lifted to
hyperproperties: A trace property pi becomes the hyperproperty
[pi] = 2pi , the powerset of pi.
We say that a partial program P robustly satisfies a hy-
perproperty H if it satisfies H for any context C. Given this
we define RHP as the preservation of robust satisfaction of
arbitrary hyperproperties:
RHP : ∀H ∈ 22Trace . ∀P. (∀CS. Behav (CS [P]) ∈ H)⇒
(∀CT. Behav (CT [P↓]) ∈ H)
The equivalent ( ) characterization of RHP is RHC :
RHC : ∀P. ∀CT. ∃CS. Behav (CT [P↓]) = Behav (CS [P])
RHC : ∀P. ∀CT. ∃CS. ∀t. CT [P↓] t ⇐⇒ CS [P] t
This requires that, for every partial program P and target
context CT, there is a (back-translated) source context CS
that perfectly preserves the set of traces of CT [P↓] when
linked to P. There are two differences from RTP: (1) the
∃CS and ∀t quantifiers are swapped, so the back-translated
CS must work for all traces t, and (2) the implication in
RTC (⇒) became a two-way implication in RHC ( ⇐⇒ ),
so compilation has to perfectly preserve the set of traces. In
particular the compiler cannot refine behavior (remove traces),
e.g., it cannot implement nondeterministic scheduling via a
deterministic scheduler.
In the following subsections we study restrictions of RHP to
various subclasses of hyperproperties. To prevent duplication
we define RHP(X) to be the robust satisfaction of a class X
of hyperproperties (so RHP above is simply RHP(22
Trace
)):
RHP(X) : ∀H ∈ X. ∀P. (∀CS. Behav (CS [P]) ∈ H)⇒
(∀CT. Behav (CT [P↓]) ∈ H)
3.2 Robust Subset-Closed Hyperproperty Preservation
(RSCHP)
If one restricts robust preservation to only subset-closed hy-
perproperties then refinement of behavior is again allowed.
A hyperproperty H is subset-closed, written H∈SC, if for
any two behaviors b1⊆b2, if b2∈H then b1∈H . For instance,
the lifting [pi] of any trace property pi is subset-closed,
but the hyperproperty H1+23 above is not. It can be made
subset-closed by allowing all smaller behaviors: HSC1+23 =
{∅, {t1}, {t2}, {t3}, {t2, t3}} is subset-closed.
Robust Subset-Closed Hyperproperty Preservation
(RSCHP) is simply defined as RHP(SC). The equivalent ( )
property-free characterization of RSCHC simply gives up the
⇐ direction of RHC:
RSCHC : ∀P. ∀CT. ∃CS. ∀t. CT [P↓] t⇒ CS [P] t
The most interesting subclass of subset-closed hyperproper-
ties is hypersafety, which we discuss next. The appendix also
studies K-subset-closed hyperproperties [52], which can be
seen as generalizing K-hypersafety below.
3.3 Robust Hypersafety Preservation (RHSP)
Hypersafety is a generalization of safety that is very important
in practice, since several important notions of noninterference
are hypersafety, such as termination-insensitive noninterfer-
ence [11, 35, 64], observational determinism [53, 63, 76], and
nonmalleable information flow [20].
According to Alpern and Schneider [10], the “bad thing”
that a safety property disallows must be finitely observable
and irremediable. For safety the “bad thing” is a finite trace
prefix that cannot be extended to any trace satisfying the
safety property. For hypersafety, Clarkson and Schneider [24]
generalize the “bad thing” to a finite set of finite trace
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prefixes that they call an observation, drawn from the set
Obs = 2FinPrefFin , which denotes the set of all finite subsets
of finite prefixes. They then lift the prefix relation to sets:
an observation o ∈ Obs is a prefix of a behavior b ∈ 2Trace,
written o≤b, if ∀m ∈ o. ∃t ∈ b. m≤t. Finally, they define
hypersafety analogously to safety, but the domains involved
include an extra level of sets:
Hypersafety,{H | ∀b 6∈H. (∃o∈Obs. o≤b∧ (∀b′≥o. b′ 6∈H))}
Here the “bad thing” is an observation o that cannot be
extended to a behavior b′ satisfying the hypersafety prop-
erty H . We use this to define Robust Hypersafety Preserva-
tion (RHSP) as RHP(Hypersafety) and propose the following
equivalent ( ) characterization for it:
RHSC : ∀P. ∀CT. ∀o ∈ Obs.
o ≤ Behav (CT [P↓])⇒ ∃CS. o ≤ Behav (CS [P])
This says that to prove RHSP one needs to be able to back-
translate a partial program P, a context CT, and a prefix o of
the behavior of CT [P↓], to a source context CS so that the
behavior of CS [P] extends o. It is possible to use the finite set
of finite executions corresponding to observation o to drive
this back-translation (as we do in §6.4).
For hypersafety the involved observations are finite sets but
their cardinality is otherwise unrestricted. In practice though,
most hypersafety properties can be falsified by very small
sets: counterexamples to termination-insensitive noninterfer-
ence [11, 35, 64] and observational determinism [53, 63, 76]
are observations containing 2 finite prefixes, while counterex-
amples to nonmalleable information flow [20] are observations
containing 4 finite prefixes. To account for this, Clarkson and
Schneider [24] introduce K-hypersafety as a restriction of
hypersafety to observations of a fixed cardinality K. Given
ObsK = 2
FinPref
Fin(K) , the set of observations with cardinality K, all
definitions and results above can be ported to K-hypersafety
by simply replacing Obs with ObsK . Specifically, we denote
by RKHSP the criterion RHP(K-Hypersafety).
The set of lifted safety properties, {[pi] | pi ∈ Safety}, is pre-
cisely the same as 1-hypersafety, since the counterexample for
them is a single finite prefix. For a more interesting example,
termination-insensitive noninterference (TINI) [11, 35, 64] can
be defined as follows in our setting:
TINI , {b | ∀t1 t2∈b. (t1 terminating ∧ t2 terminating
∧ pub-inputs(t1)=pub-inputs(t2))
⇒ pub-events(t1)=pub-events(t2)}
This requires that trace events are either inputs or outputs,
each of them associated with a security level: public or
secret. TINI ensures that for any two terminating traces of
the program behavior for which the two sequences of public
inputs are the same, the two sequences of public events—
inputs and outputs—are also the same. TINI is 2-hypersafety,
since b 6∈ TINI implies that there exist finite traces t1 and t2
that agree on the public inputs but not on all public events,
so we can simply take o = {t1, t2}. Since the traces in o
are already terminated, any extension b′ of o can only add
extra traces, i.e., {t1, t2} ⊆ b′, so b′ 6∈ TINI as needed to
conclude that TINI is in 2-hypersafety. In Figure 1, we write
Robust Termination-Insensitive Noninterference Preservation
(RTINIP) for RHP({TINI}).
3.4 Separation Between Properties and Hyperproperties
Enforcing RHSP is strictly more demanding than enforcing
RSP. Because even R2HSP (robust 2-hypersafety preserva-
tion) implies RTINIP, a compilation chain satisfying R2HSP
has to make sure that a target-level context cannot infer more
information about the internal data of P↓ than a source context
could infer about the data of P. By contrast, a RSP compilation
chain can allow arbitrary reads of P↓’s internal data, even if
P’s data is private at the source level. Intuitively, for proving
RSC, the source context produced by back-translation can
guess any secret P↓ receives in the single considered execu-
tion, but for R2HSP the single source context needs to work
for two different executions, potentially with two different
secrets, so guessing is no longer an option. We use this idea
to prove a more general separation result RTP 6⇒ RTINIP, by
exhibiting a toy compilation chain in which private variables
are readable in the target language, but not in source.
Theorem 3.1. RTP 6⇒ RTINIP
This implies a strict separation between all criteria based
on hyperproperties (the red area in Figure 1, having RTINIP
as the bottom) and all the ones based on trace properties (the
yellow area in Figure 1 having RTP as the top).
Using a more complex counterexample involving a system
of K linear equations, we have also shown that, for any K,
robust preservation of K-hypersafety, does not imply robust
preservation of (K+1)-hypersafety.
Theorem 3.2. ∀K. RKHSP 6⇒ R(K+1)HSP
3.5 Where Is Robust Hyperliveness Preservation?
Robust Hyperliveness Preservation (RHLP) does not appear
in Figure 1, because it is provably equivalent to RHP (or,
equivalently, RHC). We define RHLP as RHP(Hyperliveness)
for the following standard definition of Hyperliveness [24]:
Hyperliveness , {H | ∀o ∈ Obs. ∃b≥o. b ∈ H}
The proof that RHLP implies RHC ( ) involves showing that
{b | b6=Behav (CT [P↓])}, the hyperproperty allowing all be-
haviors other than Behav (CT [P↓]), is hyperliveness. Another
way to obtain this result is from the fact that, as in previous
models [10], each hyperproperty can be decomposed as the
intersection of two hyperliveness properties. This collapse of
preserving hyperliveness and preserving all hyperproperties
happens irrespective of the adversarial contexts.
4 Robustly Preserving Relational
Hyperproperties
Trace properties and hyperproperties are predicates on the
behavior of a single program. However, we may be interested
in showing that compilation robustly preserves relations be-
tween the behaviors of two or more programs. For example,
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suppose we optimize a partial source program P1 to P2 such
that P2 runs faster than P1 in any source context. We may
want compilation to preserve this “runs faster than” relation
between the two program behaviors against arbitrary target
contexts. Similarly, in any source context, the behaviors of
P1 and P2 may be equal and we may want the compiler to
preserve such trace equivalence [12, 25] in arbitrary target
contexts. This last criterion, which we call Robust Trace Equiv-
alence Preservation (RTEP) in Figure 1, is interesting because
in various determinate settings [21, 33] it coincides with
preserving observational equivalence, the security-relevant part
of full abstraction (see §5).
In this section, we study the robust preservation of such
relational hyperproperties and several interesting subclasses,
still relating the behaviors of multiple programs. Unlike hy-
perproperties and trace properties, relational hyperproperties
have not been defined as a general concept in the literature,
so even their definitions are new. We describe relational
hyperproperties and their robust preservation in §4.1, then look
at subclasses induced by what we call relational properties
(§4.2) and relational safety properties (§4.3). The appendix
presents a few other subclasses. The corresponding secure
compilation criteria are grouped in the blue area in Figure 1. In
§4.4 we show that, in general, none of these relational criteria
are implied by any non-relational criterion (from §2 and §3),
while in §4.5 we show two specific situations in which most
relational criteria collapse to non-relational ones.
4.1 Relational Hyperproperty Preservation (RrHP)
We define a relational hyperproperty as a predicate (relation)
on a sequence of behaviors of some length. A sequence
of programs of the same length is then said to have the
relational hyperproperty if their behaviors collectively satisfy
the predicate. Depending on the arity of the predicate, we
get different subclasses of relational hyperproperties. For arity
1, the resulting subclass describes relations on the behavior
of individual programs, which coincides with hyperproperties
(§3). For arity 2, the resulting subclass consists of relations on
the behaviors of two programs. Both examples described at the
beginning of this section lie in this subclass. This generalizes
to any finite arity K (predicates on behaviors of K programs),
and to the infinite arity.
Next, we define the robust preservation of these subclasses.
For arity 2, robust 2-relational hyperproperty preservation,
R2rHP, is defined as follows:
R2rHP : ∀R ∈ 2(Behavs2). ∀P1 P2.
(∀CS. (Behav (CS [P1]), Behav (CS [P2])) ∈ R)⇒
(∀CT. (Behav (CT [P1↓]), Behav (CT [P2↓])) ∈ R)
R2rHP says that for any binary relation R on behaviors of
programs, if the behaviors of P1 and P2 satisfy R in every
source context, then so do the behaviors of P1↓ and P2↓
in every target context. In other words, a compiler satisfies
R2rHP iff it preserves any relation between pairs of program
behaviors that hold in all contexts. In particular, such a
compilation chain preserves trace equivalence in all contexts
(i.e., RTEP), which we obtain by instantiating R with equality
in the above definition ( ). If execution time is recorded on
program traces, then such a compilation chain also preserves
relations like “the average execution time of P1 across all
inputs is no more than the average execution time of P2 across
all inputs” and “P1 runs faster than P2 on all inputs” (i.e.,
P1 is an improvement of P2). This last property can also be
described as a relational predicate on pairs of traces (rather
than behaviors); we return to this point in §4.2.
R2rHP has an equivalent ( ) property-free variant that does
not mention relations R:
R2rHC : ∀P1 P2CT.∃CS. Behav (CT [P1↓])=Behav (CS [P1])
∧ Behav (CT [P2↓])=Behav (CS [P2])
R2rHC is a generalization of RHC from §3.1, but now the
same source context CS has to simulate the behaviors of two
target programs, CT [P1↓] and CT [P2↓].
R2rHP generalizes to any finite arity K in the obvious
way, yielding RKrHP. Finally, this also generalizes to the
infinite arity. We call this Robust Relational Hyperproperty
Preservation (RrHP):
RrHP : ∀R ∈ 2(Behavsω). ∀P1, ..,PK, ...
(∀CS. (Behav (CS [P1]), .., Behav (CS [PK]), ..) ∈ R)⇒
(∀CT. (Behav (CT [P1↓]), .., Behav (CS [PK↓]), ..) ∈ R)
RrHP is the strongest criterion we study and, hence, it is
the highest point in Figure 1. This includes robustly preserving
predicates on all programs of the language, although we have
not yet found practical uses for this. More interestingly, RrHP
has a very natural equivalent property-free characterization,
RrHC, requiring for every target context CT, a source context
CS that can simulate the behavior of CT for any program:
RrHC : ∀CT. ∃CS. ∀P. Behav (CT [P↓])=Behav (CS [P])
It is instructive to compare the property-free characteriza-
tions of the preservation of robust trace properties (RTC),
hyperproperties (RHC), and relational hyperproperties (RrHC).
In RTC, the source context CS may depend on the target
context CT, the source program P and a given trace t. In
RHC, CS may depend only on CT and P. In RrHC, CS
may depend only on CT. This directly reflects the increasing
expressive power of trace properties, hyperproperties, and
relational hyperproperties, as predicates on traces, behaviors
(set of traces), and sequences of behaviors, respectively.
4.2 Relational Trace Property Preservation (RrTP)
Relational (trace) properties are the subclass of relational
hyperproperties that are fully characterized by relations on
individual traces of multiple programs. For example, the
relation “P1 runs faster than P2 on every input” is a 2-ary
relational property characterized by pairs of traces, one from
P1 and the other from P2, which either differ in the input
or where the execution time in P1’s trace is less than that
in P2’s trace. Formally, relational properties of arity K are a
subclass of relational hyperproperties of the same arity. A K-
ary relational hyperproperty is a relational (trace) property if
there is a K-ary relation R on traces such that P1, .., PK are
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related by the relational hyperproperty iff (t1, . . . , tk)∈R for
any t1∈Behav (P1), . . . , tk∈Behav (PK). Next, we define the
robust preservation of relational properties of different arities.
For arity 1, this coincides with RTP from §2.1. For arity 2,
we define Robust 2-relational Property Preservation:
R2rTP : ∀R ∈ 2(Trace2). ∀P1 P2.( ∀CS t1 t2. (CS [P1] t1 ∧ CS [P2] t2)⇒ (t1,t2)∈R)⇒( ∀CT t1 t2. (CT [P1↓] t1 ∧CT [P2↓] t2)⇒ (t1,t2)∈R)
R2rTP is weaker than its relational hyperproperty counterpart,
R2rHP (§4.1): Unlike R2rHP, R2rTP does not imply the
robust preservation of relations like “the average execution
time of P1 across all inputs is no more than the average
execution time of P2 across all inputs” (a relation between
average execution times of P1 and P2 cannot be characterized
by any relation between individual traces of P1 and P2).
R2rTP also has an equivalent ( ) characterization:
R2rTC : ∀P1 P2 CT t1 t2.
(CT [P1↓] t1 ∧ CT [P2↓] t2)⇒
∃CS. (CS [P1] t1 ∧ CS [P2] t2)
Establishing R2rTC requires constructing a source context CS
that can simultaneously simulate a given trace of CT [P1↓]
and a given trace of CT [P2↓]. R2rTP generalizes from arity
2 to any finite arity K (yielding RKrTP) and the infinite one
(yielding RrTP) in the obvious way.
4.3 Robust Relational Safety Preservation (RrSP)
Relational safety properties are a natural generalization of
safety and hypersafety properties to multiple programs, and
an important subclass of relational trace properties. Several
interesting relational trace properties are actually relational
safety properties. For instance, if we restrict the earlier rela-
tional trace property “P1 runs faster than P2 on all inputs” to
terminating programs it becomes a relational safety property,
characterized by pairs of bad terminating prefixes, where
both prefixes have the same input, and the left prefix shows
termination no earlier than the right prefix.
Formally, a relation R ∈ 2(TraceK) is K-relational safety
if for every K “bad” traces (t1, . . . , tK) 6∈ R, there exist K
“bad” finite prefixes m1, . . . ,mk such that ∀i. mi ≤ ti, and
any K traces (t′1, . . . , t
′
K) pointwise extending m1, . . . ,mk are
also not in the relation, i.e., ∀i. mi ≤ t′i implies (t′1, . . . , t′K) 6∈
R. Then, Robust 2-relational Safety Preservation (R2rSP) is
simply defined by restricting R2rTP to only 2-relational safety
properties. The equivalent ( ) property-free characterization
for R2rSP is the following:
R2rSC : ∀P1 P2 CT m1 m2.
(CT [P1↓] m1 ∧ CT [P2↓] m2)⇒
∃CS. (CS [P1] m1 ∧ CS [P2] m2)
The only difference from the stronger R2rTC (§4.2) is
between considering full traces and only finite prefixes. Again,
R2rSP generalizes to any finite arity K (yielding RKrSP) and
the infinite one (yielding RrSP) in the obvious way.
4.4 Separation Between Relational and Non-Relational
Relational (hyper)properties (§4.1, §4.2) and hyperproperties
(§3) are different but both have a “relational” nature: relational
(hyper)properties are relations on the behaviors or traces of
multiple programs, while hyperproperties are relations on
multiple traces of the same program. So one may wonder
whether there is any case in which the robust preservation
of a class of relational (hyper)properties is equivalent to that
of a class of hyperproperties. Could a compiler that robustly
preserves all hyperproperties (RHP, §3.1) also robustly pre-
serves at least some class of 2-relational (hyper)properties?
In §4.5 we show special cases in which this is indeed the
case, while here we now show that in general RHP does not
imply the robust preservation of any subclass of relational
properties that we have described so far (except, of course,
relational properties of arity 1, that are just hyperproperties).
Since RHP is the strongest non-relational robust preservation
criterion that we study, this also means that no non-relational
robust preservation criterion implies any relational robust
preservation criterion in Figure 1. So, all edges from relational
to non-relational criteria in Figure 1 are strict implications.
To prove this, we build a compilation chain satisfying RHP,
but not R2rSP, the weakest relational criterion in Figure 1.
Theorem 4.1. RHP 6⇒ R2rSP
Proof sketch. Consider a source language that lacks code
introspection, and a target language that is exactly the same,
but additionally has a primitive with which the context can
read the code of the compiled program as data [69]. Consider
the trivial compiler that is syntactically the identity. It is clear
that this compiler satisfies RHP since the added operation of
code introspection offers no advantage to the context when
we consider properties of a single program, as is the case
in RHP. More precisely, in establishing RHC, the property-
free characterization of RHP, given a target context CT and a
program P, we can construct a simulating source context CS
by modifying CT to hard-code P wherever CT performs code
introspection. This works as CS can depend on P in RHC.
Now consider two programs that differ only in some dead
code, that both read a value from the context and write it
back verbatim to the output. These two programs satisfy the
relational safety property “the outputs of the two programs
are equal” in any source context. However, there is a trivial
target context that causes the compiled programs to break this
relational property. This context reads the code of the program
it is linked to, and provides 1 as input if it happens to be the
first of our two programs and 2 otherwise. Consequently, in
this target context, the two programs produce outputs 1 and 2
and do not have this relational safety property in all contexts.
Hence, this compiler does not satisfy R2rSP. Technically, the
trick of hard-coding the program in CS no longer works since
there are two different programs here.
This proof provides a fundamental insight: To robustly pre-
serve any subclass of relational (hyper)properties, compilation
must ensure that target contexts cannot learn anything about
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the syntactic program they interact with beyond what source
contexts can also learn. When the target language is low-level,
hiding code attributes can be difficult: it may require padding
the code segment of the compiled program to a fixed size, and
cleaning or hiding any code-layout-dependent data like code
pointers from memory and registers when passing control to
the context. These complex protections are not necessary for
any non-relational preservation criteria (even RHP), but are
already known to be necessary for fully abstract compilation
to low-level code [44, 46, 59]. They can also be trivially
circumvented if the context has access to any side-channels,
e.g., it can measure time via a different thread. In fact, in
such settings trying to hide the source code can be seen as
a hopeless attempt at “security through obscurity”, which is
widely rejected by cryptographers since the early days [47].
4.5 Composing Contexts Using Full Reflection or
Internal Nondeterminism in the Source Language
The proof of the previous separation theorem strongly relies
on the absence of code introspection in the source language.
However, if source contexts can obtain complete intrinsic
information about the programs they are linked with, then RHP
implies R2rHP. Such “full reflection” facilities are available
in languages such as Lisp [69] and Smalltalk. For proving this
collapse we inspect the alternative characterizations, RHC and
R2rHC. The main difference between these two criteria, as
explained in §4.1, is that the source context CS obtained by
R2rHC depends on two, possibly distinct programs P1 and P2
and a target context CT, while every possible source context
obtained by RHC depends on one single program. Hence, by
applying RHC once for P1 and once for P2, with the same
context CT, we obtain two source contexts CS1 and CS2 that
are a priori unrelated. Without further hypotheses, one cannot
show R2rHC. However, with full reflection we can define a
source context C′S that behaves exactly like CS1 when linked
with P1, and like CS2 otherwise. We can use this construction
to show not only that RHP implies R2rHP, but also that
robust preservation of each class of finite-relational properties
collapses to the corresponding hyperproperty-based criterion:
Theorem 4.2. If the source language has full reflection then
RHP⇒RKrHP, RSCHP⇒RKrTP, and R2HSP⇒RFrSP.
One may wonder whether some other condition exists
that makes robust preservation of relational hyperproperty
classes collapse even to the corresponding trace-property-
based criteria (§2). This is indeed the case when the source
language has an internal nondeterministic choice operator ⊕,
such that the behavior of P1 ⊕ P2 is at least the union of
the behaviors of P1 and P2. Such an operator is standard
in process calculi [65]. To illustrate this we show that RTC
implies R2rTC. Note that R2rTC produces a source context
CS that depends on a target context, two source programs P1
and P2 and two, possibly incomparable, traces t1 and t2. RTC
produces a context depending only on a single trace of a single
source program. We can apply RTC twice: once for t1 and
P1 obtaining CS1 and once for t2 and P2 obtaining CS2 . To
prove R2rTC we need to build a source context that over-
approximates the behaviors of both CS1 and CS2 . This context
can be CS1 ⊕ CS2 . Hence, in this setting RTC (RTP) implies
R2rTC (R2rTP). This result generalizes to any finite arity.
Theorem 4.3. If the source language has an internal nonde-
terministic choice operator on contexts then RTP⇒ RKrTP,
RSCHP⇒ RFrSCHP, and RSP⇒ RFrSP.
Notice that since contexts are finite objects, the techniques
above only produce collapses in cases where finitely many
source contexts need to be composed. Criteria relying on
infinite-arity relations such as RrHP and RrTP are thus not
impacted by these collapses. The appendix has more details
and collapsed variants of Figure 1.
5 Where Is Full Abstraction?
Full abstraction—the preservation and reflection of observa-
tional equivalence—is a well-studied criterion for secure com-
pilation (§7). The security-relevant direction of full abstraction
is Observational Equivalence Preservation (OEP) [28, 60]:
OEP : ∀P1 P2. P1 ≈ P2 ⇒ P1↓ ≈ P2↓
One natural question is how OEP relates to our criteria of
robust preservation.
Here we answer this question for languages without in-
ternal nondeterminism. In such determinate [33, 51] settings
observational equivalence coincides with trace equivalence in
all contexts [21, 33] and, hence, OEP coincides with robust
trace-equivalence preservation (RTEP). As explained in §4.1,
it is obvious that RTEP is an instance of R2rHP, obtained by
choosing equality as the relation R. However, for determinate
languages with input totality [36, 75] (if the program accepts
one input value, it has to also accept any other input value) we
have proved that even the weaker R2rTP implies RTEP ( ).
This proof also requires that if a whole program can produce
every finite prefix of an infinite trace then it can also produce
the complete trace, but we have showed that this holds for the
infinite traces produced in a standard way by any determinate
small-step semantics. Under these assumptions, we have in
fact proved that RTEP follows from the even weaker Robust
2-relational relaXed safety Preservation (R2rXP). The class
2-relational relaXed safety is a variant of 2-relational Safety
from §4.3; with this relaxed variant “bad” prefixes x1 and x2
are allowed to end with silent divergence (denoted as XPref ):
R ∈ 2-relational relaXed safety ⇐⇒
∀(t1, t2) 6∈R. ∃x1 x2∈XPref . ∀t′1≥x1 t′2≥x2. (t′1, t′2)6∈R
Theorem 5.1. Assuming a determinate source language and a
determinate and input total small-step semantics for the target
language, R2rXP⇒ RTEP.
In the other direction, we adapt an existing counterexam-
ple [57] to show that RTEP (and, hence, for determinate
languages also OEP) does not imply RSP or any of the criteria
above it in Figure 1. Fundamentally, RTEP only requires
preserving equivalence of behavior. Consequently, an RTEP
compiler can insert code that violates any security property, as
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long as it doesn’t alter these equivalences [57]. Worse, even
when the RTEP compiler is also required to be correct (i.e.,
TP, SCC, and CCC from §2.1), the compiled program only
needs to properly deal with interactions with target contexts
that behave like source ones, and can behave insecurely when
interacting with target contexts that have no source equivalent.
Theorem 5.2. There exists a compiler between two determin-
istic languages that satisfies RTEP, TP, SCC, and CCC, but
that does not satisfy RSP.
Proof. Consider a source language where a partial program
receives a natural number or boolean from the context, and
produces a number output, which is the only event. We
compile to a restricted language that only has numbers by
mapping booleans true and false to 0 and 1 respectively. The
compiler’s only interesting aspect is that it translates a source
function P = f(x:Bool) 7→ e that inputs booleans to P↓ =
f(x:Nat) 7→if x<2 then e↓ else if x<3 then f(x) else 42.
The compiled function checks if its input is a valid boolean (0
or 1). If so, it executes e↓. Otherwise, it behaves insecurely,
silently diverging on input 2 and outputting 42 on inputs 3 or
more. This compiler does not satisfy RSP since the source
program f(x:Bool)7→0 robustly satisfies the safety property
“never output 42”, but the program’s compilation does not.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that this compiler is
correct since a compiled program behaves exactly like its
source counterpart on correct inputs. It is also easily seen
to satisfy RTEP, since the additional behaviors added by the
compiler (silently diverging on input 2 and outputting 42 on
inputs 3 or more) are independent of the source code (they
only depend on the type), so these cannot be used by any
target context to distinguish two compiled programs.
In the appendix, we use the same counterexample compila-
tion chain to also show that RTEP does not imply the robust
preservation of (our variant of) liveness properties. We also
use a simple extension of this compilation chain to show that
RTEP does not imply RTINIP either. The idea is similar: we
add a secret external input to the languages and when receiving
an out of bounds argument the compiled code simply leaks the
secret input, which breaks RTINIP, but not RTEP.
6 Proof Techniques for RrHP and RFrXP
This section demonstrates that the criteria we introduce can
be proved by adapting existing back-translation techniques.
We introduce a statically typed source language and a similar
dynamically typed target one (§6.1), as well as a simple
translation between the two (§6.2). We then describe the
essence of two very different secure compilation proofs for
this compilation chain, both based on techniques originally
developed for showing fully abstract compilation. The first
proof shows (a typed variant of) RrHP (§6.3), the strongest
criterion from Figure 1, using a context-based back-translation,
which provides a “universal embedding” of a target con-
text into a source context [56]. The second proof shows
a slightly weaker criterion, Robust Finite-relational relaXed
safety Preservation (RFrXP; §6.4), but which is still very
useful, as it implies robust preservation of arbitrary safety and
hypersafety properties as well as RTEP. This second proof
relies on a trace-based back-translation [43, 59], extended
to produce a context from a finite set of finite execution
prefixes. These finiteness restrictions are offset by a more
generic proof technique that only depends on the context-
program interaction (e.g., calls and returns), while ignoring
all other language details. For space reasons, we leave the
details of the proofs for the appendix.
6.1 Source and Target Languages
The two languages we consider are simple first-order lan-
guages with named procedures and boolean and natural values.
The source language Lτ is typed while the target language Lu
is untyped. A program in either language is a collection of
function definitions, each function body is a pure expression
that can perform comparison and natural operations (⊕),
conditional branching, recursive calls, and use let-in bindings.
Expressions can also read naturals from the environment and
write naturals to the environment, both of which generate trace
events. Lu has all the features of Lτ and adds a primitive
e has τ to dynamically check whether an expression e has
type τ . A context C can call functions and perform general
computation on the returned values, but it cannot directly gen-
erate read and write e events, as those are security-sensitive.
Since contexts are single expressions, we disallow callbacks
from the program to the context: thus calls go from context
to program, and returns from program to context.
Programs P ::= I;F Contexts C ::= e
Types τ ::= Bool | Nat Interfaces I ::= f : τ → τ
Functions F ::= f(x : τ) : τ 7→ ret e
Expressions e ::= x | true | false | n ∈ N | e⊕ e | e ≥ e
| let x : τ = e in e | if e then e else e
| call f e | read | write e | fail
Programs P ::= I;F Contexts C ::= e
Types τ ::= Bool | Nat Interfaces I ::= f
Functions F ::= f(x) 7→ ret e
Expressions e ::= x | true | false | n ∈ N | e⊕ e | e ≥ e
| let x = e in e | if e then e else e
| call f e | read | write e | fail | e has τ
Labels λ ::=  | α
Actions α ::= read n | write n | ⇓ | ⇑ | ⊥
Each language has a standard small-step operational seman-
tics (omitted for brevity), as well as a big-step trace semantics
(Ω α, as in previous sections). The initial state of a program
P plugged into a context C is denoted as P . C and the
behavior of such a program is the set of traces that can be
produced by the semantics:
Behav (C[P]) = {α | P . C α}
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6.2 Compiler
The compiler ·↓ takes programs of Lτ and generates programs
of Lu, by replacing static type annotations with dynamic type
checks of function arguments upon function invocation:
I1, · · · , Im;F1, · · · ,Fn↓ = I1↓, · · · , Im↓; F1↓, · · · , Fn↓
f : τ → τ ′y = f
f(x : τ) : τ ′ 7→
ret e
y =
(
f(x) 7→ret if x has τ↓
then e↓ else fail
)
Nat↓ = Nat Bool↓ = Bool
true↓ = true false↓ = false
n↓ = n x↓ = x
e⊕ e′y = e↓ ⊕ e′y e ≥ e′y = e↓ ≥ e′y
read↓ = read write e↓ = write e↓
call f e↓ = call f e↓
let x : τ=e
in e′
y = let x=e↓in e′y if e then e
′
else e′′
y = if e↓ then e′
y
else e′′
y
6.3 Proof of RrHP by Context-Based Back-Translation
To prove that ·↓ attains RrHP, we need a way to back-translate
target contexts into source contexts. To this end we use a
universal embedding, a technique previously proposed for
proving fully abstract compilation [56]. The back-translation
needs to generate a source context that respects source-level
constraints; in this case, the resulting source context must
be well-typed. To ensure this, we use Nat as an universal
back-translation type in the produced source contexts. The
intuition of the back-translation is that it will encode true as
0, false as 1 and an arbitrary natural number n as n + 2. Based
on this encoding, we translate values between regular source
types and the back-translation type. Specifically, we define the
following shorthand for the back-translation: injectτ (e) takes
an expression e of type τ and returns an expression of back-
translation type; extractτ (e) takes an expression e of the back-
translation type and returns an expression of type τ .
injectNat(e) = e + 2
injectBool(e) = if e then 1 else 0
extractNat(e) =
(
let x=e in if x ≥ 2 then x− 2 else fail)
extractBool(e) =
(
let x=e in if x ≥ 2 then fail
else if x + 1 ≥ 2 then true else false
)
injectτ (e) never incurs runtime errors, but extractτ (e) may.
This mimics the ability of target contexts to write ill-typed
code (e.g., 3+ true) which we must be able to back-translate
and whose semantics we must preserve (see Example 6.1).
Concretely, the back-translation is defined inductively on
the structure of target contexts:
true↑ = 1 false↑ = 0 n↑ = n + 2 x↑ = x
e ≥ e′x = let x1 : Nat=extractNat(e↑)
in let x2 : Nat=extractNat(e
′x)
in injectBool(x1 ≥ x2)
e⊕ e′x = let x1 : Nat=extractNat(e↑)
in let x2 : Nat=extractNat(e
′x)
in injectNat(x1⊕ x2)
let x=e in e′
x = let x : Nat=e↑ in e′x(
if e then
e′ else e′′
)x = if extractBool(e↑) then e′x else e′′x
e has Bool↑ = let x : Nat=e↑ in if x ≥ 2 then 0 else 1
e has Nat↑ = let x : Nat=e↑ in if x ≥ 2 then 1 else 0
call f e↑ = injectτ ′(call f extractτ (e↑))
if f : τ → τ ′ ∈ I
fail↑ = fail
Example 6.1 (Back-Translation). Through the back-
translation of two simple target contexts we explain why ·↑
is correct and why it needs inject· and extract·.
Consider the context C1 = 3 ∗ 5, which reduces to 15 irre-
spective of the program it links against. The back-translation
must intuitively ensure that C1↑ reduces to 17, which is the
back-translation of 15. If we unfold the definition of C1↑ we
have the following (given that 3↑=5 and 5↑=7):
let x1 : Nat=extractNat(5)
in let x2 : Nat=extractNat(7) in injectNat(x1 ∗ x2)
By examining the code of extractNat we see that in both
cases it will just perform a subtraction by 2, turning 5 and
7 respectively into 3 and 5. So after some reduction steps
we arrive at the following term: injectNat(3 ∗ 5). The inner
multiplication then returns 15 and its injection returns 17,
which is also the result of 15↑.
Let us now consider a different context, C2 = false+ 3.
We know that no matter what program links against it, it will
reduce to fail. Its statically well-typed back-translation is:
let x1 : Nat=extractNat(0)
in let x2 : Nat=extractNat(7) in injectNat(x1 ∗ x2)
By looking at its code we can see that the execution of
extractNat(0) will indeed result in fail, which is what we want
and expect, as that is precisely the back-translation of fail. 
The RrHP proof for this compilation chain uses a simple
logical relation that includes cases for both terms of source
type (intuitively used for compiler correctness) and for terms
of back-translation type [28, 56].
6.4 Proof of RFrXP by Trace-Based Back-Translation
Proving that this simple compilation chain attains RFrXC does
not require back-translating a target context, as we only need
to build a source context that can reproduce a finite set of
finite trace prefixes, but that is not necessarily equivalent to
the original target context. We describe this back-translation
on an example leaving again details to the online appendix.
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Example 6.2 (Back-Translation of Traces). Consider the fol-
lowing two programs:
P1 = (f(x:Nat) : Nat 7→ ret x, g(x:Nat) : Bool 7→ ret true)
P2 = (f(x:Nat) : Nat 7→ ret read, g(x:Nat) : Bool 7→ ret true)
Their compiled counterparts are almost identical, with the
only addition of dynamic type checks on function arguments:
P1↓ = f(x) 7→ ret (if x has Nat then x else fail),
g(x) 7→ ret (if x has Nat then true else fail)
P2↓ = f(x) 7→ ret (if x has Nat then read else fail),
g(x) 7→ ret (if x has Nat then true else fail)
Now, consider the following target context:
C = let x1=call f 5
in if x1 ≥ 5 then call g (x1) else call g (false)
The two programs plugged into this context can generate
(at least) the following traces (where ⇓ indicates termination
and ⊥ indicates failure):
C[P1↓] ⇓ C[P2↓] read 5;⇓ C[P2↓] read 0;⊥
In the execution of C[P1↓], the program executes completely
and terminates, producing no side effects. In the first execution
of C[P2↓], the program reads 5, and the then branch of the
context’s conditional is executed. In the second execution of
C[P2↓], the program reads 0, the else branch of the context’s
conditional is executed and the program fails in g after
detecting a type error.
These traces alone are not enough to construct a source
context since they do not record information about the control
flow of program executions, specifically on which function
produces which input or output. To recover this information
we enrich execution prefixes with information about calls
(from context to program) and returns (from program to
context). The enriched rules on calls and returns now generate
events to model these control flows. If a call or return occurs
internally within the program, no trace event is generated
since they are not relevant for back-translating the context.
The revised semantics is almost identical to the original, and
allows exactly the same program executions, only producing
more informative traces. Hence, the original execution can be
enriched in a valid way for the new semantics.
Labels λ ::= · · · | β Interactions β ::= call f v | ret v
The traces produced by the compiled programs plugged into
the context become:
C[P1↓] call f 5; ret 5; call g 5; ret true;⇓
C[P2↓] call f 5; read 5; ret 5; call g 5; ret true;⇓
C[P2↓] call f 5; read 0; ret 0; call g false;⊥
In our languages, reads and writes can only be performed
by programs, while the context only performs a sequence of
calls to the program, possibly performing some computation
and branching on return values. Thus, the role of the back-
translated source is to perform the appropriate calls to the
program, depending of the values returned. The inner workings
of the programs, that is inputs, outputs, and internal calls
and returns, are not a concern of the back-translation and
are obtained through compiler correctness. Furthermore, the
context is shared by all executions, but each execution has its
own program. Hence, since I/O occurs only in the program,
the only source of variation among all executions come from
the program.
From this, one can conclude that the context is a deter-
ministic expression, calling the program, and branching on
the returned values. This can be seen in the way traces are
organized: ignoring the I/O, the traces form a tree (Figure 2, on
the left). This tree can be translated to a source context using
nested conditionals as depicted below (Figure 2, on the right,
dotted lines indicated what the back-translation generates for
each action in the tree). When additional branches are missing
(e.g., there is no third trace that analyzes the first return or
no second trace that analyses the second return on the left
execution), the back-translation inserts fail in the code – they
are dead code branches (marked with a **).
call f 5
ret 5
call g 5
ret true
⇓
ret 0
call g false
⊥
let x=call f 5
in if x == 5
then let y=call g 5 in
if y == true then 0
else fail
else if x == 0
then fail else fail
**
Fig. 2: Example of a back-translation of traces.
To prove RFrXP we show correctness of the back-
translation, which ensures that the back-translated source
context produces exactly the original non-informative traces.
This is, however, not completely true of informative traces
(that track calls and returns). Since calling g with a boolean
is ill-typed, our back-translation shifts the failure from the
program to the context, so the picture links call g false action
to a fail. The call is never executed at the source level. 
7 Related Work
Full Abstraction was originally used as a criterion for
secure compilation in the seminal work of Abadi [1] and
has since received a lot of attention [60]. Abadi [1] and,
later, Kennedy [46] identified failures of full abstraction in the
Java to JVM and C# to CIL compilers, some of which were
fixed, but also others for which fixing was deemed too costly
compared to the perceived practical security gain. Abadi et al.
[3] proved full abstraction of secure channel implementations
using cryptography, but to prevent network traffic attacks they
had to introduce noise in their translation, which in practice
would consume network bandwidth. Ahmed et al. [6, 7, 56]
proved the full abstraction of type-preserving compiler passes
for simple functional languages. Abadi and Plotkin [2] and
Jagadeesan et al. [42] expressed the protection provided by
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address space layout randomization as a probabilistic variant
of full abstraction. Fournet et al. [37] devised a fully abstract
compiler from a subset of ML to JavaScript. Patrignani et
al. [59] studied fully abstract compilation to machine code,
starting from single modules written in simple, idealized
object-oriented and functional languages and targeting a hard-
ware isolation mechanism similar to Intel’s SGX [41].
Until recently, most formal work on secure interoperability
with linked target code was focused only on fully abstract
compilation. The goal of our work is to explore a diverse
set of secure compilation criteria, some of them formally
stronger than (the interesting direction of) full abstraction
at least in various determinate settings, and thus potentially
harder to achieve and prove, some of them apparently easier
to achieve and prove than full abstraction, but most of them
not directly comparable to full abstraction. This exploration
clarifies the trade-off between security guarantees and efficient
enforcement for secure compilation: On one extreme, RTP
robustly preserves only trace properties, but does not require
enforcing confidentiality; on the other extreme, robustly pre-
serving relational properties gives very strong guarantees, but
requires enforcing that both the private data and the code of
a program remain hidden from the context, which is often
much harder to achieve. The best criterion to apply depends
on the application domain, but our framework can be used
to address interesting design questions such as the following:
(1) What secure compilation criterion, when violated, would
the developers of practical compilers be willing to fix at least
in principle? The work of Kennedy [46] indicates that fully
abstract compilation is not such a good answer to this question,
and we wonder whether RTP or RHP could be better answers.
(2) What secure compilation criterion would the translations of
Abadi et al. [3] still satisfy if they did not introduce (inefficient)
noise to prevent network traffic analysis? Abadi et al. [3]
explicitly leave this problem open in their paper, and we
believe one answer could be RTP, since it does not require
preserving any confidentiality.
We also hope that our work can help eliminate common
misconceptions about the security guarantees provided (or not)
by full abstraction. For instance, Fournet et al. [37] illustrate
the difficulty of achieving security for JavaScript code using
a simple example policy that (1) restricts message sending
to only correct URLs and (2) prevents leaking certain secret
data. Then they go on to prove full abstraction apparently in
the hope of preventing contexts from violating such policies.
However, part (1) of this policy is a safety property and part
(2) is hypersafety, and as we showed in §4.5 fully abstract
compilation does not imply the robust preservation of such
properties. In contrast, proving RHSP would directly imply
this, without putting any artificial restrictions on code intro-
spection, which are unnecessarily required by full abstraction.
Unfortunately, this is not the only work in the literature that
uses full abstraction even when it is not the right hammer.
Development of RSP Two pieces of concurrent work have
examined more carefully how to attain and prove one of
the weakest of our criteria, RSP (§2.2). Patrignani and Garg
[58] show RSP for compilers from simple sequential and
concurrent languages to capabilities [74]. They observe that if
the source language has a verification system for robust safety
and compilation is limited to verified programs, then RSP can
be established without directly resorting to back-translation.
(This observation has also been made independently by Dave
Swasey in private communication to us.) Abate et al. [4] aim
at devising secure compilation chains for protecting mutually
distrustful components written in an unsafe language like C.
They show that by moving away from the full abstraction
variant used in earlier work [44] to a variant of our RSP
criterion from §2.2, they can support a more realistic model
of dynamic component compromise, while at the same time
obtaining a criterion that is easier to achieve and prove than
full abstraction.
Hypersafety Preservation The high-level idea of specify-
ing secure compilation as the preservation of properties and
hyperproperties goes back to the work of Patrignani and
Garg [57]. However, that work’s technical development is
limited to one criterion—the preservation of finite prefixes of
program traces by compilation. Superficially, this is similar to
one of our criteria, RHSP, but there are several differences
even from RHSP. First, Patrignani and Garg [57] do not
consider adversarial contexts explicitly. This might suffice for
their setting of closed reactive programs, where traces are
inherently fully abstract (so considering the adversarial context
is irrelevant), but not in general. Second, they are interested in
designing a criterion that accommodates specific fail-safe like
mechanisms for low-level enforcement, so the preservation of
hypersafety properties is not perfect, and one has to show,
for every relevant property, that the criterion is meaningful.
However, Patrignani and Garg [57] consider translations of
trace symbols induced by compilation, an extension that would
also be interesting for our criteria (§8).
Proof techniques New et al. [56] present a back-translation
technique based on a universal type embedding in the source
for the purpose of proving full abstraction of translations
from typed to untyped languages. In §6.3 we adapted the
same technique to show RrHP for a simple translation from
a statically typed to a dynamically typed language with first-
order functions and I/O. Devriese et al. [28] show that even
when a precise universal type does not exist in the source,
one can use an approximate embedding that only works for
a certain number of execution steps. They illustrate such an
approximate back-translation by proving full abstraction for a
compiler from the simply-typed to the untyped λ-calculus.
Jeffrey and Rathke [43] introduced a “trace-based” back-
translation technique. They were interested in proving full
abstraction for so-called trace semantics. This technique was
then adapted to show full abstraction of compilation chains to
low-level target languages [59]. In §6.4, we showed how these
trace-based techniques can be extended to prove all the criteria
below RFrXP in Figure 1, which includes robust preservation
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of safety, of noninterference, and in a determinate setting also
of observational equivalence.
While many other proof techniques have been previously
proposed [2, 3, 7, 37, 42], proofs of full abstraction remain
notoriously difficult, even for simple translations, with appar-
ently simple conjectures surviving for decades before being
finally settled [29]. It will be interesting to investigate which
existing full abstraction techniques can be repurposed to show
the stronger criteria from Figure 1. For instance, it will be
interesting to determine the strongest criterion from Figure 1
for which an approximate back-translation [28] can be used.
Source-level verification of robust satisfaction While this
paper studies the preservation of robust properties in compi-
lation chains, formally verifying that a partial source program
robustly satisfies a specification is a challenging problem too.
So far, most of the research has focused on techniques for
proving observational equivalence [25, 43] or trace equiv-
alence [12, 21]. Robust satisfaction of trace properties has
been model checked for systems modeled by nondetermin-
istic Moore machines and properties specified by branching
temporal logic [49]. Robust safety, the robust satisfaction of
safety properties, was studied for the analysis of security
protocols [39], and more recently for compositional verifica-
tion [71]. Verifying the robust satisfaction of relational hyper-
properties beyond observational equivalence and trace equiva-
lence seems to be an open research problem. For addressing it,
one can hopefully take inspiration in extensions of relational
Hoare logic [15] for dealing with cryptographic adversaries
represented as procedures parameterized by oracles [13].
Other Kinds of Secure Compilation In this paper we
investigated the various kinds of security guarantees one can
obtain from a compilation chain that protects the compiled
program against linked adversarial low-level code. While this
is an instance of secure compilation [8], this emerging area
is much broader. Since there are many ways in which a
compilation chain can be “more secure”, there are also many
different notions of secure compilation, with different security
goals and attacker models. A class secure compilation chains
is aimed at providing a “safer” semantics for unsafe low-
level languages like C and C++, for instance ensuring memory
safety [22, 32, 54]. Other secure compilation work is targeted
at closing down side-channels: for instance by preserving
the secret independence guarantees of the source code [14],
or making sure that the code erasing secrets is not simply
optimized away by the unaware compilers [17, 27, 30, 67].
Closer to our work is the work on building compartmentalizing
compilation chains [4, 18, 40, 74] for unsafe languages like C
and C++. In particular, as mentioned above, Abate et al. [4]
have recently showed how RSP can be extended to express the
security guarantees obtained by protecting mutually distrustful
components against each other.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper proposes a foundation for secure interoperability
with linked target code by exploring many different criteria
based on robust property preservation (Figure 1). Yet the
road to building practical secure compilation chains achieving
any of these criteria remains long and challenging. Even
for RSP, scaling up to realistic programming languages and
efficiently enforcing protection of the compiled program with-
out restrictions on the linked context is challenging [4, 58].
For R2HSP the problem is even harder, because one also
needs to protect the secrecy of the program’s data, which is
especially challenging in a realistic model in which the context
can observe side-channels like timing. Here, an RTINIP-like
property might be the best one can hope for in practice.
In this paper we assumed for simplicity that traces are
exactly the same in both the source and target language, and
while this assumption is currently true for other work like
CompCert [51] as well, it is a restriction nonetheless. We plan
to lift this restriction in the future.
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